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Foreword
In June, 1977, Michael N. Chetkovich, then chairman of the American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants, acting at the direction of the
board of directors of the Institute, appointed a five-man group to
study the recommendations of the Commission on Auditors’ Respon
sibilities pertaining to the structure of the AICPA Auditing Standards
Executive Committee and to make recommendations. This Report
is the product of that assignment.
During the course of our study, we received assistance from
numerous individuals who were interested in strengthening and
improving the structure of the auditing standards-setting body. We
wish to acknowledge with appreciation that assistance, including
particularly Thomas R. Hanley, our administrative secretary, and
Professor David Solomons who assisted in drafting the Report.

Ivan O. Bull
Philip L. Defliese
Samuel A. Derieux
Louis M. Kessler
Walter J. Oliphant, Chairman

May, 1978

iv

Origin and Scope of the
Committee’s Study
The AICPA Special Committee to Study the Structure of the Audit
ing Standards Executive Committee (AudSEC) was established in
June, 1977, as an indirect result of the Report of Tentative Con
clusions of the Commission on Auditors’ Responsibilities (the Cohen
commission).1 The direct response by the AICPA to the commis
sion’s tentative conclusions, which were made public in April, 1977,
was the creation of an AICPA Special Committee Regarding the
Commission on Auditors’ Responsibilities (the Derieux committee).
That committee reported that it was not convinced of the soundness
of the Cohen commission’s principal recommendation relating to
the setting of auditing standards, namely that the present volunteer
Institute committee charged with that responsibility, AudSEC, should
be replaced by a full-time paid board. The Derieux committee tenta
tively concluded that a number of more modest interrelated changes
in AudSEC’s organization and operation might be considered:

Reduce AudSEC membership to fifteen.
Rotate representation of the eight largest firms.
Change voting to a simple majority.
Open meetings to the public.
Establish a new committee to set standards for accounting and
review service engagements.
6. Establish a mechanism to assure that AudSEC gives greater
consideration to the needs of nonpublic companies in estab
lishing auditing standards.
7. Provide increased staff capability to help expedite the work
of AudSEC.

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

The committee further recommended that another special com
mittee be appointed to study the restructuring of AudSEC, and it
was in response to that recommendation that the present committee
was established.
1. Both references to the Cohen commission are to the commission’s Final
Report, released in January, 1978.
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It should be noted that our charge was limited to the examina
tion of the structure within the AICPA for developing auditing stand
ards to determine what changes, if any, are necessary to improve
that process. We were not asked to undertake a critical evaluation
of AudSEC’s published statements nor to become involved with
technical questions of auditing theory or practice. The scope
of our study has been restricted accordingly.

Conduct of the Study
Since the committee’s meeting on August 30, 1977, it has met on
seven separate occasions for a total of nine days. Two additional
days were devoted to a public hearing held in New York on Feb
ruary 2 and 3,1978.
The committee began its study by reviewing internal statistical
data that traced the subjects placed on the agenda of AudSEC
during the past fifteen years from inception to disposition. Particu
lar attention was paid to the nature of the subjects and the time
required to dispose of them during the last five years.
During the second phase of the study, we conducted thirty-two
informal interviews designed to elicit the opinions of users of fin
ancial information and of others who are knowledgeable about or
interested in the auditing standards-setting process. Individuals
interviewed were associated with

•
•
•
•
•

Government
Professional organizations
National securities markets
The legal profession
Public accounting firms

In addition, the committee interviewed representatives of both the
Commission on Auditors’ Responsibilities and AudSEC as well as
their staff directors.
The third and final phase of the study was the conduct of a
formal public hearing, which was announced throughout the pro
fession and among governmental agencies, professional organiza
tions, the academic community, securities regulators, and other
interested parties. A copy of the announcement was mailed to each
of the AICPA’s 135,000 members. The public hearing resulted in
oral and/or written submissions by forty-three individuals and or
ganizations.
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The information and opinions received by the committee in the
course of its study were carefully considered. The committee’s
conclusions were not disclosed to anyone outside its staff prior to
their presentation to the Board of Directors of the Institute in the
form of a preliminary report. The conclusions reached in that re
port were subsequently published in the CPA Letter of March 27,
1978, and in the April, 1978, issue of the Journal of Accountancy.
The committee has decided that the proceedings of the public
hearing and related submissions should constitute a public record.
Accordingly, the documents are available for public inspection at
the offices of the AICPA, 1211 Avenue of the Americas, New York,
N. Y. 10036, and comprise the following materials:

1. A full transcript of the oral proceedings at the committee’s
public hearing on February 2 and 3, 1978.
2. Copies of all written submissions to the committee in response
to the notice of public hearing.
Copies of any of the foregoing are available for examination on
request, and copies may be purchased from the AICPA.
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The Development of
Auditing Standards
The development of the profession’s efforts to formulate auditing
standards can be traced back at least to 1917, when the American
Institute of Accountants (as the AICPA was then called) prepared
a memorandum on “balance sheet audits” for the Federal Trade
Commission. This memorandum, published in the Federal Reserve
Bulletin of April, 1917, under the title Approved Methods for the
Preparation of Balance Sheet Statements, was reissued, revised
and expanded, with significant changes in title and terminology,
in the ensuing years. But, it was the McKesson & Robbins case
(1938) creating as it did a “crisis in auditing,” to use John L. Carey’s
phrase, that demonstrated that auditors needed much more guid
ance to enable them to meet their responsibilities to stockholders
and the general public.2 In January, 1939, the Institute appointed
a special committee “to examine into auditing procedure and other
related questions in the light of recent public discussion.” The
special committee’s report, Extensions of Auditing Procedure, was
adopted by Council in May, 1939, and, with modifications, by the
Institute’s members in September of that year. By an amendment
to the bylaws, the AICPA Committee on Auditing Procedure was
established as a standing committee of the Institute.3
Extensions of Auditing Procedure was issued in October, 1939,
the first in the series of Statements of Auditing Procedure (SAPs)
and further pronouncements followed. In February, 1941, the SEC
adopted a requirement in Accounting Series Release (ASR) no. 21,
that the independent accountant’s report on financial statements
filed with the commission state “whether the audit was made in
accordance with generally accepted auditing standards applicable
in the circumstances.” This prompted the committee on auditing
procedure to embark on a special study of auditing standards,
while continuing to issue pronouncements on auditing procedure.
2. John L. Carey, The Rise of the Accounting Profession, 2 vols. (New York:
AICPA, 1970), vol. 2.
3. It was not until April, 1966, that, by resolution of the executive committee of
the Institute, the authority of the committee on auditing procedure to make
binding pronouncements on auditing without having them approved by the
members of the Institute was put beyond doubt.
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Because of delays due to World War II, the committee’s report
on this study was not published until October, 1947, when it issued
its Tentative Statement of Auditing Standards—Their Generally
Accepted Significance and Scope. The nine standards set out in
this report were adopted by the Institute’s membership in Septem
ber, 1948, and a tenth standard was adopted the following year.
The year 1948 is also noteworthy because in October the commit
tee presented in SAP no. 24 a “recommended revised short form of
accountant’s report or certificate,” which is substantially the same
as the standard form of report now used.
The committee on auditing procedure distinguished standards
from procedures by saying that procedures related to acts to be
performed, whereas standards dealt with “measures of the quality
of the performance of those acts and the objectives to be obtained
by the use of the procedures undertaken. Auditing standards, as
distinct from auditing procedures, concern themselves not only with
the auditor’s professional qualities but also with the judgment exer
cised by him in the performance of his examination and in his
report.”4 These standards have been incorporated into the sev
eral codifications of committee pronouncements issued in 1951,
1954, 1963, and 1973. Since 1973, all statements issued by the
committee have been Statements on Auditing Standards (SASs).
They have always covered both standards and procedures.
In 1972, as the Institute prepared for the replacement of the
AICPA Accounting Principles Board (a senior Institute committee)
by the independent Financial Accounting Standards Board, it reor
ganized itself into a number of divisions, each with an executive
committee. At this time the accounting standards executive com
mittee came into existence as a new senior Institute committee
for the purpose, among other things, of providing input to the
FASB. It was at this time also that the committee on auditing pro
cedure was reorganized as the auditing standards executive com
mittee (AudSEC), the name by which it is now known.

Sources of Auditing Standards
Indications of the need for auditing standards have come from a
number of different directions. Sometimes members of AudSEC
or its predecessor committee have themselves taken the initiative
4. AICPA, Professional Standards, Looseleaf Service, 4 vols. (New York: Com
merce Clearing House), vol. 1, AU sec. 150.01.
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to have matters placed on the committee’s agenda. Examples of
statements that originated in that way are SAP no. 39 (September,
1967), Working Papers, which was a response to the need for further
guidance regarding working papers for examinations of financial
statements or for other engagements to which any of the generally
accepted auditing standards apply; SAP no. 54 (November, 1972),
The Auditor’s Study and Evaluation of Internal Control; and SAS
no. 11 (December, 1975), Using the Work of a Specialist, such as
an actuary, an appraiser, or a geologist.
Other auditing standards have developed out of the work of
other AICPA divisions or other organizations within the profession.
For example, SAP no. 42 (January, 1970), Reporting When a Certi
fied Public Accountant Is Not Independent, resulted from Opinion
no. 15, Independence, of the ethics division’s committee on profes
sional ethics. This SAP dealt with the responsibilities of a CPA
who is associated with financial statements and who is not inde
pendent. At the present time, AudSEC is working on a standard
dealing with auditors’ reports on financial forecasts. Guidelines for
the preparation of such forecasts have already been issued by the
Institute’s management advisory services division. Impetus for audit
ing standards has also come from the accounting principles board
and the Financial Accounting Standards Board. For example, SAP
no. 50 (November, 1971) revised the auditors standard report to
give recognition to the provisions of APB Opinion no. 19, Reporting
Changes in Financial Position. SAS no. 10 (December, 1975), In
terim Financial Information, was issued because of questions raised
about the need for auditor involvement in connection with the pro
visions of APB Opinion no. 28.
Finally, from within the profession, state societies of CPAs,
Institute members, or CPA firms have on several occasions asked
for guidance. SAP no. 38 (September, 1967), Unaudited Financial
Statements, SAP no. 49 (November, 1971), Reports on Internal Con
trol, and SAS no. 5 (July, 1975), which clarifies the meaning of “pre
sent fairly in conformity with generally accepted accounting princi
ples,” are all examples of auditing standards that originated in
this way.
A number of auditing standards have also been formulated in
response to pressures from outside the profession. The SEC has
been one source of such pressure. To give just two examples,
SAS no. 4 (December, 1974), Quality Control Considerations for a
Firm of Independent Auditors, was a response to criticism from the
commission on the quality of practice of CPA firms. SAS no. 13
(May, 1976), Reports on Limited Review of Interim Financial Infor
mation, was made necessary by ASR no. 177. Several other ex
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amples of the direct influence of the SEC on auditing standards
could be cited.
Litigation has also generated auditing standards. The im
portance of the McKesson & Robbins case in this connection has
already been mentioned. SAP no. 37 (September, 1966), Special
Report: Public Warehouses—Controls and Auditing Procedures for
Goods Held, arose out of the Allied Crude Vegetable Oil Refining
Corporation case. SAP no. 41 (October, 1969), Subsequent Dis
covery of Facts Existing at the Date of Auditor’s Report, was a re
sult of the Yale Express case. Two of the most troublesome stand
ards, SAS no. 6 (July, 1975), Related Party Transactions and also
SAS no. 7 (October, 1975), Communications Between Predecessor
and Successor Auditors, resulted from the U.S. Financial case. Most
recently, SAS no. 16 (January, 1977), The Independent Auditor’s
Responsibility for the Detection of Errors or Irregularities, was issued
after a special committee, which had looked into the Equity Fund
ing case, had found a need for a clarification of previous pronounce
ments on the auditor’s responsibility for the detection of fraud.
Finally, a fairly recent example of an auditing standard which
was issued in response to concerns expressed in Congress and in
the press is provided by SAS no. 17 (January, 1977), Illegal Acts by
Clients. This provides guidance for an auditor when client acts
that appear to him to be illegal, such as bribes and political contri
butions, and when other breaches of the law come to his attention.
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The Present Organization—
Its Strengths and Weaknesses
The auditing standards executive committee has authority for the
promulgation of generally accepted auditing standards (GAAS),
which are binding on members of the AICPA under rule 202 of the
Institute’s rules of conduct. AudSEC’s pronouncements do not re
quire clearance from either the Institute’s Council or its board of
directors, and pronouncements by other AICPA committees that
have a bearing on auditing and reporting matters must be cleared
with the chairman of AudSEC. It goes without saying that, behind
any disciplinary proceedings that might be brought by the Institute
for failing to follow GAAS, there lie the more serious consequences
of action by the SEC and the dangers of costly litigation.
AudSEC consists of twenty-one members, all of whom are mem
bers of the AICPA. At the present time, twenty members are in
public practice and one is a professor of accounting. All are ap
pointed annually by the chaiman of the Institute, with the approval
of the broad of directors. Normally they serve for not more than
three years, and, by rotation, one-third of the members retire each
year.
All the members of the committee, including the chairman,
serve part-time and are expected to devote at least one-third of their
time to committee work. The work is entirely unpaid, and, although
a claim for reimbursement of expenses may be made, reimburse
ment is not requested commonly. Support from members’ firms is
not limited to the unpaid time spent on the committee’s work and the
unreimbursed expenses, but often includes the additional time of
advisers and others.
The preparatory and drafting work on an auditing standard is
carried out by task forces with the assistance of the staff. Task
forces usually have a member of AudSEC as chairman and may
include persons who are not members of the committee. Persons
who are not members of the Institute may assist in task force
activities as consultants. At any one time, there may be as many
as twenty-five task forces at work on projects that are expected to
result in statements on auditing standards.
Besides the auditing standards executive committee, the audit
ing standards division has a number of standing committees and
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subcommittees, and these, like AudSEC itself, are appointed an
nually by the chairman of the board of the Institute. The division
has subcommittees on statistical sampling, stockbrokerage, com
modity futures trading, methods of perpetration and detection of
fraud, and nonprofit organizations. The work of the division is
facilitated by standing committees on insurance companies, em
ployee benefit plans and ERISA, and relations with actuaries. There
are also special committees to develop audit and accounting guides
for agribusiness and motor carriers. Other committees administered
by division staff are developing guidance on reports by manage
ment, corporate conduct policy statements, and evaluations of in
ternal accounting control that will ultimately be used by AudSEC.
The staff of the auditing standards division is headed by a
director and at present includes five managers, one assistant man
ager, and three clerical staff. The staff provides administrative and
technical assistance to AudSEC and its subcommittees and task
forces, and to several other committees that are not part of the
division.
The initial draft of a statement on auditing standards is usually
prepared by a task force for consideration by AudSEC and, if ap
proved for public exposure, is mailed to approximately 25,000 indi
viduals and groups, including practice offices, state societies, the
SEC, and the stock exchanges. The exposure period is normally
sixty to ninety days, after which the comments received are con
sidered by the task force and a final draft is submitted to AudSEC
for its approval.
Issuance of a final statement or of an exposure draft requires
the written affirmative approval of two-thirds of the members of
AudSEC. If the total of the members who dissent to publication of
a final statement and the members who qualify their approval with
respect to the same issue exceeds one-third of the members of
AudSEC at the time the vote is taken, the document will be deemed
not to have been approved. Votes are taken on each paragraph
separately, so that each paragraph must receive at least fourteen
votes to be approved.
Besides the statements on auditing standards, the division is
responsible for issuing auditing interpretations and audit guides.
Interpretations are clarifications of matters on which AudSEC has
already issued a statement. They are prepared by the staff, and
before publication, they must be approved by the Institute’s vicepresident—technical, the chairman of AudSEC, and director of
the auditing standards division. The first auditing interpretation
was issued in 1972.
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Audit guides have been issued since 1965 to cover auditing
and reporting for industries that have unusual characteristics or that
require special attention. For example, guides have been issued on
savings and loan associations, colleges and universities, and volun
tary health and welfare organizations. An audit guide may be ex
posed or issued only with the approval of the committee or task
force that prepared it, and it must be cleared by the chairman of
AudSEC, often after consulting with members of the committee. The
guide also must be cleared by the chairman of the accounting stand
ards executive committee (AcSEC) if it includes a description of an
industry’s accounting practices.

The Strengths of the Present Arrangements

Though the accounting profession, and auditors in particular, have
come in for a good deal of criticism in recent years, that criticism
has not been particularly directed at the process of setting auditing
standards, and such criticism as there has been (which will be noted
later) has been muted. Even Professor Abraham Briloff, who has
harshly criticized the performance of auditors, has had little to say
about the auditing standards themselves or the means by which
they have been formulated.5
In his monograph, Obtaining Agreement on Standards in the
Accounting Profession, Professor Maurice Moonitz’s verdict on the
profession’s performance in setting auditing standards was much
more reassuring than he was in relation to accounting standards.
He says,
The existing set of standards is not perfect, nor is it necessarily
the best in the world, nor are the standards, such as they are, metic
ulously observed by all practitioners in all circumstances. The record
does show that the profession is able to generate the ‘written ex
pression of what constitutes generally accepted auditing standards.’
No one can claim that the set of standards does not exist. Further
more, when the profession wants to, or has to, it can revise those
standards and do so quickly. It also has at hand an enforcement
mechanism that it can use if it chooses to do so. The organization
is there. It works.6
5. U.S., Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on Reports, Accounting and Manage
ment of the Committee on Government Operations, The Accounting Establish
ment, Senate Doc. 95-34, March, 1977, App. K.
6. Maurice Moonitz, Obtaining Agreement on Standards in the Accounting Pro
fession (Sarasota, Fla.: American Accounting Association, 1974). p. 7.
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And again, later in this monograph he says in the same context,
“The organizational pattern fits the task to be done. The process
works.”7
Although the Cohen commission’s recommendations call for a
fairly radical change in the standards-setting process, from the
present large part-time unpaid committee to a small full-time board,
its judgment of the present arrangements was not altogether un
favorable. “The Commission believes that the auditing standardssetting process has worked reasonably well. Neither the Commis
sion’s examination of significant cases against auditors nor any of
its other research has uncovered significant evidence that audit
failures are generally traceable to deficiencies in existing auditing
standards. Existing auditing standards could be improved, and
many improvements are suggested in this report. However, the
existing standards-setting structure appears quite capable of provid
ing the necessary evolution.”8
What are the strengths of the present arrangements? We re
view them here to help put the need for any changes into perspective.
1. The setting of auditing standards is in the hands of auditors,
who are best equipped by knowledge and experience to assess
the costs and benefits of auditing. In the words of the Cohen
commission, “no need has been established for taking the
auditing standards-setting function from the domain of the ac
counting profession. Such a drastic institutional change would
involve substantial costs. It cannot be justified unless signifi
cant improvements are needed and can be expected to result
from the change.”9 The burden of proof that significant im
provements are to be expected must rest on anyone who pro
poses a different arrangement.
2. Auditing standards are set within the AICPA, the body whose
rules of conduct must be one of the principal instruments for
upholding them. The Institute’s authority is much broader, if
less potent, than that of the SEC, for the number of businesses
subject to SEC jurisdiction is only a small proportion of all U.S.
businesses, incorporated and unincorporated. If responsibility
for the enforcement of auditing standards rests with the Insti
tute, it seems appropriate that responsibility for formulating
7. Moonitz, Obtaining Agreement on Standards, p. 76.
8. Commission on Auditors’ Responsibilities, Report, Conclusions, and Recom
mendations (New York: Commission on Auditors’ Responsibilities, 1978), p. 128.
9. Commission on Auditors’ Responsibilities, Report, Conclusions, and Recom
mendations, pp. 127-28.
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those standards should be there also. However, we recognize
that members of the Institute may agree to bind themselves to
enforce extra-legal rules made by some other body, as they do
in the case of FASB pronouncements through rule 203 of the
Institute’s rules of conduct.
3. A large volunteer committee, the members of which have the
support of their firms, can bring to bear on some highly tech
nical problems the talents and skills of numerous practitioners
with diverse backgrounds and points of view. This is particu
larly important when the demands made by numerous subcom
mittees and task forces are taken into account. However, we
recognize that as the size of a volunteer body grows, there
is inevitably a tradeoff between the increasing amount of talent
it can command and the increasing difficulty of communication
and control.
4. If standards are to be effective, they must command widespread
support. They are more likely to do so if they are developed
within the profession than if they are imposed from outside, or
even if they are imposed by a group within the profession which
stands apart from those who must apply the standards.

Criticisms of the Present Arrangements
As the Cohen commission noted, “in contrast to the amount of
criticism generated by the accounting standards-setting process,
suggestions for change in setting auditing standards have been
infrequent.”10 The commission believes that this has resulted, in
part, from the relative lack of public interest in auditing standards
as compared with accounting standards. But it went on to what it
regarded as weaknesses in the process of setting auditing standards.
The commission’s first criticism is that “present guidance on
the application of auditing standards to audits of different size en
tities is inadequate. More attention should be accorded to the
possible effect of variations in audit clients on the nature and extent
of audit procedures; additional guidance specifically applicable to
audits of smaller entities should be given.”11

10. Commission
mendations,
11. Commission
mendations.

on Auditors’ Responsibilities, Report, Conclusions, and Recom
p. 132.
on Auditors’ Responsibilities, Report, Conclusions, and Recom
p. 133.

12

It is not necessary for us to determine whether this criticism
of AudSEC is justified. If it is, it is an issue to which AudSEC should
be responsive, but it hardly calls for radical structural changes.
Moreover, as the commission noted, the AICPA has already set up
a new senior technical committee, the accounting and review serv
ices committee, whose charge is as follows:
To develop on a continuing basis procedures and standards of re
porting by CPAs on the types of accounting and review services a
CPA may render in connection with unaudited financial statements
or other unaudited financial information of an entity that is not re
quired to file financial statements with a regulatory agency in con
nection with the sale or trading of its securities in a public market.
This charge shall not include any of the responsibilities of the Ac
counting Standards Executive Committee.

Smaller auditing firms are well represented on both committees,
which gives added assurance that the needs of smaller clients will
not be ignored.
The commission’s next criticism is that “many pronouncements
could usefully provide more specific guidance. In particular, when
a pronouncement deals with the nature and extent of audit pro
cedures to be applied, there appears to be a tendency to make the
guidance as general as possible.”12
The examples given by the commission are from SAS no. 1,
Part of Examination Made by Other independent Auditors, and SAS
no. 9, The Effect of an Internal Audit Function on the Scope of the
Independent Auditor’s Examination. In connection with SAS no. 1,
the criticism is that the auditor is given no specific direction on how
large a portion of the financial statements can be examined by other
auditors. The complaint against SAS no. 9 is that no guidance is
given as to when internal auditors may be used to provide direct
assistance in performing an examination or how much supervision
they require.
It must be a matter of opinion as to how far an auditing stand
ard can usefully go in giving specific directions, thereby limiting the
scope for the auditor’s use of his professional judgment. It has been
pointed out many times that standards are not text books. Stand
ards-setting bodies are always perilously poised between the dan
gers of excessive generality on the one hand and undue specificity
on the other. Again, we believe that, if the commission’s criticism is
justified, it is one that does not call for major surgery. We also be
12. Commission on Auditors’ Responsibilities. Report, Conclusions, and Recom
mendations, p. 133.
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lieve that some of the proposals we make in this report will con
tribute to an improvement in the effectiveness of auditing standards
in the future.
The commission’s criticism of excessive generality in auditing
standards is coupled with a suggestion that AudSEC has been re
luctant to be specific because its members believe that innovations
in auditing are proprietary matters and that “any competitive ad
vantage that might be gained by developing methods and ap
proaches to auditing might be lost if the new knowledge was
shared.”13 The commission recognizes that “many, if not most, of
the technological and methodological advances in auditing have in
fact been developed by auditing firms.”14 This fact powerfully rein
forces our belief that the authority to set auditing standards should
remain in the hands of auditors, and preferably of auditors who have
not been segregated from their practicing colleagues, as would be
required by the commission’s proposal for a full-time board. The
commission asserts that AudSEC’s productivity is too low, that some
standards take too long to get out, and that there is a failure to
anticipate problems before they become acute.
Like the commission, we are concerned to improve the pro
ductivity of the standards-setting process, regarding both the time
liness and quality of the output, and the proposals that we make
later in this report to reduce the size of AudSEC and to expand and
strengthen its staff are designed to that end. Unfortunately, speed
sometimes can be achieved only at the expense of quality, and
without the protracted consideration that some difficult matters on
AudSEC’s agenda have received, broadly acceptable standards
could not have been developed. There is, however, no doubt that
the formulation of some auditing standards has taken too long.
The case usually cited is SAS no. 6, Related Party Transactions.
Consideration of this standard was begun in February, 1969, fol
lowing the Continental Vending case, and was not concluded until
July, 1975, when the U.S. Financial case made standard setting a
matter of urgency. The questions that gave the committee most
trouble were primarily accounting issues rather than issues of an
auditing nature. There were not, nor are there now, any accounting
standards for the measurement and disclosure of transactions not
entered into at arm’s length. Some of the troublesome questions
are these:
13. Commission
mendations,
14. Commission
mendations,

on Auditors’ Responsibilities, Report, Conclusions, and Recom
p. 134.
on Auditors’ Responsibilities, Report, Conclusions, and Recom
p. 134.
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• When is a transaction between related parties equivalent to a
similar transaction entered into at arm’s length?
• Would the transaction have been entered into at all if the
parties had been at arm’s length?
• How much reliance can be placed on management representa
tions in such circumstances?
• How much and what kinds of disclosure should be required
concerning related party transactions?
• Does a related party transaction have a lower “materiality
threshold” than is normally applied?
• What special audit procedures are necessary to identify and
probe related party transactions?

These are only some of the complexities that arose in the commit
tee’s consideration of this exceedingly difficult matter and held up
the issuance of a standard.
That AudSEC has failed to anticipate problems or to quickly
recognize emerging problems is an easy charge to bring and a
difficult one to rebut. However, the proposal we shall outline for
an advisory council to work with AudSEC should provide a remedy
for any lack of foresight that the committee may have shown in the
past.
The final criticism voiced by the Cohen Commission concerns
the quality of the members of AudSEC and of its staff. The com
mission was critical particularly of the limitation of a member’s
term to three years, under the AICPA’s policy. This, the commis
sion says, slows the momentum of some projects. Our later pro
posals are responsive, we believe, to the commission’s point. Its
other point that, AudSEC’s members being part-time volunteers,
they have “significant client responsibilities, so that the amount of
time they can devote is less than is desirable” must be weighed
against the advantages of having auditing standards set by prac
ticing auditors.15 Our proposals also bear on this criticism by the
commission and go far to lessen its force.
John C. Burton, a former chief accountant of the SEC and
now a professor at Columbia University, is among AudSEC’s sever
est critics. Writing in the Journal of Accountancy to advocate what
he calls a “legislatively-sanctioned self-regulating body,” he says—
In general, the standard-setting mechanism has not resulted in an
innovative approach to the auditing function but has tended to en
15. Commission on Auditors’ Responsibilities, Report, Conclusions, and Recom
mendations, p. 135.
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shrine or justify current practices. Recent auditing standards have
emphasized protection against litigation, and their consideration by
AudSEC has been heavily influenced by participation of legal counsel
for the major firms. AudSEC has been hesitant to increase auditors’
responsibilities except under pressure from outside forces.16

This again is an area where judgments may legitimately differ.
It is questionable whether it is within the province of a standardssetting body to seek to increase auditors’ responsibilities, at least
until it has been demonstrated that there is a need to expand them
and that the benefits to society are likely to exceed the costs. One
can well imagine that aggressive action by the profession to expand
the scope of its work and its responsibilities, with a concomitant in
crease in its fees, would be met by a charge of self-aggrandizement.
In one area where increased responsibilities might have been as
sumed by the profession—financial forecasts—the SEC was itself,
until recently a restraining influence. This matter, incidentally, has
been occupying AudSEC’s attention for some time and a new
auditing standard dealing with forecasts is currently under discus
sion.
We share Dr. Burton’s concern that the profession should be
responsive to its social obligations, in the matter of auditing stand
ards as in other aspects, though we do not agree with him that an
extension of public regulation is the way to go in the 1980s. Rather,
we agree with Mr. Sommer, a former commissioner of the SEC,
when he says of Dr. Burton’s proposal that—
it runs directly against the increasingly predominant current of Amer
ican opinion, which looks to a reduction in the level of existing regu
lation, abstention from the adoption of more regulation unless the
reason is extremely compelling, and a greater reliance on the subtler
forces in our society to bring about evolutionary reform.17

In accordance with this spirit, we prefer to endeavor to achieve
the same ends as Dr. Burton but within the framework of the
AICPA. We think our own more modest proposals are superior
to any more drastic system of regulation by a government or a
quasi-government agency.

16. John C. Burton, “The Profession’s Institutional Structure in the 1980s,”
Journal of Accountancy, April, 1978, p. 66.
17. A. A. Sommer, Jr., “The Lion and the Lamb: Can the Profession Live with
‘Cooperative Regulation’?” Journal of Accountancy, April, 1978, p. 73.
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The Cohen Commission’s Proposal
and an Alternative
The Cohen commission’s principal proposal for improvement of the
standards-setting process in the auditing field is to replace AudSEC
by a smaller full-time auditing standards board within the AICPA
and compensated by the Institute on a scale comparable with the
present earnings of its members. The members would be appointed,
as AudSEC now is, by the chairman of the board of the AICPA
with the approval of the board of directors.
This proposal does not appear to follow from the commission’s
analysis of the standards-setting process which, as we have already
noted, the commission “believes ... has worked reasonably well.”
There would, of course, be an attractive symmetry between a fulltime auditing standards board and the full-time Financial Account
ing Standards Board. Yet the two fields are less alike than might
appear at first sight, and the arguments which led to the creation
of the FASB do not apply with anything like the same force in the
sphere of auditing.
The principal argument for establishing the FASB as a full-time
body outside the AICPA rested on the need for accounting standards
to be in the hands of a body whose members would be, and would
be seen to be, independent of the interests of their clients. The
need for those who set standards to be independent is not nearly
so great in the case of auditing as in accounting, for private interests
outside the profession are much less sensitive to changes in audit
ing standards than they are to pronouncements of the FASB.
If there is an “independence” argument at all in favor of a
full-time board, it is that members of a volunteer board may be
unduly reluctant to vote for a standard that would necessitate a
change in their firms’ present practices, with all the dislocation
and expense that may ensue. The cost to society of a change re
sulting from a new standard is indeed one of the considerations
which should be taken into account when the proposal for it is
being debated. We have seen no evidence that desirable changes
in auditing standards have been blocked by such considerations,
though there may have been some delays. The change in the vot
ing rule that we recommend below will help to expedite the stand
ards-setting process, and the proposed advisory council should
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act as a safeguard against any undue self-protectiveness that
AudSEC members might be tempted to show.
A second reason for setting up the FASB as a full-time free
standing body outside the AICPA was the opportunity which it gave
to obtain skills and viewpoints not to be found among members of
the Institute. However, there is much less scope for outsiders to
contribute to discussions of auditing than to discussions of account
ing, and there is little interest in the subject outside the ranks of
the profession. Our proposals make suitable provision for the con
tributions of persons outside the profession by opening AudSEC
to nonmembers of the Institute and by the establishment of an ad
visory council whose members may be drawn from a variety of fields.
The foregoing considerations greatly weaken the arguments
for a full-time body, and we think that the commission underesti
mates the strength of the arguments against such a move. Two
considerations weigh heavily with us. First, a gulf may develop be
tween the profession and a full-time board. A situation in which
“they” set the standards and “we” observe and enforce them is
best avoided. Second, a full-time board may have difficulty recruit
ing persons of the right caliber to serve on it. Even if a “revolving
door” policy were accepted, whereby members of the board could
return to their former firms after serving on it for several years, our
inquiries leave considerable doubt about the availability of the most
able practitioners for service on the board.
A compromise arrangement between a wholly full-time paid
board and a wholly part-time board—a compromise that commands
a good deal of support—is to have a part-time board with a fulltime highly paid chairman. Two members of the committee, Messrs.
Bull and Oliphant, favor this arrangement. Three members of the
committee, Messrs. Defliese, Derieux, and Kessler, favor a part-time
board with a part-time chairman and a highly paid executive di
rector. The arguments in support of these two positions are set out
below.
The minority view is based on the following arguments:
1. A full-time chairman will be able to give the board his undivided
attention. He will be available at all times to discuss the board’s
business and will be able to provide day-to-day supervision
of the staff. He will not be distracted by the need to be avail
able to his partners for consultation or otherwise in the conduct
of his firm’s affairs. He will thus be in the best position to pro
vide effective leadership to the board and its staff.
2. He will have maximum visibility as the recognized leader of
the profession and the board’s spokesman in matters directly
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3.

4.

5.

6.

relating to auditing standards. At a time when Congress and
the SEC are taking a lively interest in the profession, this fact
has considerable appeal.
A full-time chairman will be in a better position to take a longrange view of the board’s business, to plan ahead, and to give
thought to emerging problems before they become urgent.
The position of full-time chairman, with the visibility and salary
that would go with it, should prove attractive to well-qualified
candidates, including some associated with smaller firms. Out
standing candidates are more likely to be attracted to this posi
tion than to a position as executive director.
A full-time chairman would be able to serve a longer term than
could be expected of a volunteer chairman. This would provide
for greater continuity and would be likely to attract a better
staff with less staff turnover.
A change to a full-time chairman, following the example of the
Institute’s full-time president, more effectively signals the pro
fession’s readiness to respond to the needs of the times.

The arguments advanced by the majority in support of a volun
teer, part-time chairman are as follows:
1. Though nominally part-time, a volunteer chairman would in fact
devote almost all of his time to work of the board. He would
have the support of a highly paid executive director, and such
a team could provide better leadership than could a full-time
chairman. The post of executive director would attract better
candidates if the chairman were part-time.
2. A full-time chairman would not be able to move faster than
the rest of the board, so that there would be no gain in expedi
tion from such an arrangement.
3. A full-time chairman would have to interrupt his career path.
It would, therefore, probably be difficult to attract a field of out
standing candidates. It would also be more difficult to replace
an unsuccessful full-time chairman.
4. Practitioners would identify less easily with a full-time chair
man than with a volunteer. A volunteer would command more
support from his fellow practitioners, for they would see him as
presenting less of a threat of becoming an auditing “czar.”
5. There is more likely to be a harmonious relationship within the
board if all its members, including the chairman, are volunteers.
6. There would be a minor problem of fitting a full-time chairman
into the Institute’s organizational structure.
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7. If the auditing standards board were now to be established
with a volunteer chairman, it would be easier to move to a fulltime chairman subsequently, if this were seen to be necessary.
The appointment of a full-time chairman now would not be
easily reversible; and as the selection would require great care,
the creation of the new board might be seriously delayed.

The recommendations in this report are based on the assump
tion that the majority view will prevail. If it does not—if the chairman
of the auditing standards board is to be a full-time officer of the
Institute—some of the recommendations which follow, such as those
relating to the term of office of the chairman and the position of the
executive director, would need to be modified. However, we wish to
emphasize that all of the other proposals in this report command our
unanimous support. Once the position of the chairman and related
issues have been resolved we urge that our recommendations be
effected with the utmost dispatch. This is not a time for further reflec
tion and delay.
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Recommendations
We propose that AudSEC be reconstituted within the AICPA as the
AICPA Auditing Standards Board, with the following charge:
The AICPA Auditing Standards Board shall be responsible for
the promulgation of auditing standards and procedures to be
observed by members of the AICPA in accordance with the
Institute’s rules of conduct.
The board shall be alert to new opportunities for auditors
to serve the public, both by the assumption of new responsi
bilities and by improved ways of meeting old ones, and shall
as expeditiously as possible develop standards and pro
cedures that will enable the auditor to assume those responsi
bilities.
Auditing standards and procedures promulgated by the
board shall—

a. Define the nature and extent of the auditor’s responsi
bilities.
b. Provide guidance to the auditor in carrying out his duties,
enabling him to express an opinion on the reliability of
the representations on which he is reporting.
c. Make special provision, where appropriate, to meet the
needs of small enterprises.
d. Have regard to the costs which they impose on society in
relation to the benefits reasonably expected to be de
rived from the audit function.
The auditing standards board shall provide auditors with
all possible guidance in the implementation of its pronounce
ments, by means of interpretations of its statements, by the
issuance of guidelines, and by any other means available to it.

Composition and Appointment of the Board
We agree with the widely held view that AudSEC is at present too
large to be fully effective. We recommend that the new board have
fifteen members, a number still large enough to provide a variety of
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points of view. Any person who has had extensive experience in
auditing, whether a member of the Institute or not, should be eligible
to serve. Experience in auditing might include internal auditing and
governmental auditing. Board members need not be currently en
gaged in auditing. Thus persons in academe or industry with suit
able previous experience would be eligible. However, we think
that at least two-thirds of the board members should be Institute
members currently in public practice. They should be drawn from
all sizes and kinds of firms. We do not think it desirable to stipulate
quotas to secure representation of any particular segment of the
practicing profession.
The inclusion on the board of persons who are not members of
the Institute will necessitate a change in the bylaws. This change
can be effected on the first occasion when other changes have to
be made.
The appointment of the chairman and members of the auditing
standards board should be by the chairman of the Institute with the
consent of its board of directors. Recommendations should be
sought from various interested groups such as state societies and
from firms within the profession. They should also be requested
from the advisory council, the creation of which we recommend
below.
The chairman and members of the board should be appointed
for renewable one-year terms. Normally they should expect to
serve for three years, with the possibility of reappointment for a
longer period that would not extend their service beyond a total of
six years. A shorter period than three years is too short to yield the
full benefit from the learning period; a period longer than six years
would allow too little turnover. Reappointments each year make it
easy to replace ineffectual members without undue delay.
It is advantageous to choose a chairman who has previously
served as a board member, though previous board membership
should not be a requirement.

Votes and Meetings
At present, approval of an auditing standard requires a two-thirds
majority of AudSEC, or fourteen affirmative votes in a committee of
twenty-one members. There is some support for a change to a
simple majority rule. The FASB has recently made such a change.
If our recommendation for a board of fifteen persons is adopted,
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we believe that nine affirmative votes should be required to approve
a statement. This is one more than a simple majority but is less
restrictive of change than a two-thirds majority rule is apt to be.
In accordance with Institute policy, those portions of the
board’s meetings relating to (a) the establishment of standards
through statements on auditing standards, and (b) other auditing
and reporting matters directly affecting the public interest will
be open to the public. Meetings and portions of meetings relating to
other matters may be held in private. On particular issues, it may
be desirable for the board to hold public hearings.
Despite the Wheat committee’s contrary recommendation, the
FASB now publishes dissenting opinions when a standard is issued,
and we see no reason why the auditing standards board should not
do likewise. Dissents often clarify the majority opinion that is being
dissented from. They also force the dissenters to think through and
articulate the minority view. We are content to leave this matter in
the hands of the board.

Compensation of the Board
At the present time, the Institute pays no compensation to AudSEC
members. Reimbursement is made for expenses incurred if a mem
ber requests it. This arrangement puts a relatively heavy burden on
members from small firms and may discourage some from accepting
appointment to the committee. This is perhaps the strongest argu
ment against an all-volunteer board.
We propose that, in return for a commitment of at least fifty
percent of his time to the work of the board, a member (including
the chairman) may request compensation. Such payment should
be determined by the board of directors to offset in part any loss of
income which results from the commitment of the member’s time.
In addition, members should routinely be reimbursed for expenses.
We recognize that the foregoing proposal will create a prece
dent in relation to the work of other Institute committees. However,
the heavy commitment of time involved in the setting of inforceable
standards gives rise to special problems. Members of small firms
have made heavy sacrifices to serve the Institute in the past. We
want to ensure that the best talent will continue to be available,
wherever it can be found.
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An Expanded and Strengthened Staff

At present, AudSEC’s staff consists of a director and six other pro
fessional staff members. In our view, the staff has performed well
considering the work load it has been expected to carry. Much of
the responsibility for research which precedes the issuance of an
auditing statement falls on the firms to which AudSEC’s members
belong. We propose that the staff be considerably expanded and
strengthened, to enable it to undertake more research, to provide
more support for the task forces that will perform much of the pre
paratory work on new standards, and to take over more of the work
of drafting. As the Cohen commission noted, the staff assigned by
the Institute to auditing standards has increased to its present size
from only one or two persons in 1970.
At the head of the staff there should be a highly qualified, wellpaid executive director. At hearings before governmental bodies
and on other public occasions where auditing standards are under
discussion, the board would normally be represented by the chair
man and director appearing together. Except in administrative mat
ters, the director will report to the chairman and members of the
auditing standards board, and he will work in close and constant
contact with the chairman to maintain the pace of the board’s work.
The two will also have to collaborate closely in drawing up the
board’s agenda and in overseeing the task forces.
In calling for a strengthening of the staff, we are particularly
concerned to insure that the board should have all the research
capability it needs. One member of the staff should be designated
to direct the necessary research and should be appointed primarily
for his research skills. He should report directly to the executive
director, under whom he will have responsibility for directing the
board’s research activities.
If the chairman and executive director, in consultation with the
research director, think that research needs to be done that is be
yond the capacity of the staff, either because of the pressure of
other work or because special skills are required, it will be within
their province to select an outside consultant to do the work for a
fee. Consultants will sometimes be academics, sometimes partners
or staff members of practicing firms, and occasionally, perhaps, will
be drawn from neither of these categories. The board’s budget
will, of course, have to provide for such needs.
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Task Forces
Task forces will be set up by the board as necessary to do the pre
paratory work on a new statement. Membership of a task force will
not necessarily be confined to Institute members. A task force may
include one or more board members, but this is not necessary.
Members of task forces will not be paid but may claim reimburse
ment of expenses. The report of a task force will be in the nature
of a recommendation to the board which the board may accept,
reject, or amend as it sees fit. Since the task forces will not be mak
ing final decisions, their meetings need not be open to the public.
An Auditing Standards Advisory Council
There is widespread support for the idea that the auditing standards
board should have an advisory council to work with it, and we be
lieve that such a council could contribute materially to the board’s
effectiveness. The council’s principal functions would be—

1. To bring to the board’s attention problems calling for new
standards or revisions or interpretations of previous pronounce
ments.
2. To review the board’s agenda and to offer guidance on the
priorities implicit in the agenda.
3. To review proposed pronouncements of the board in an ad
visory capacity, both before and after they have been exposed
for public comment.
4. To recommend persons to serve on the standards board and
on its task forces.
5. To report at least annually on the work of the board and the
extent to which it has fulfilled its charge. This report will be
made to the board of directors of the Institute and will be made
public.
The advisory council should have between twelve and eighteen
members. As the Wheat committee said of the Financial Account
ing Standards Advisory Council, “the only qualification for member
ship on the advisory council should be a capacity to make a con
tribution to the work of the Standards Board.” Its members might
include, for example, preparers and users of financial statements,
academics, financial analysts, government officials, lawyers, bank
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ers, underwriters, and CPAs (whether engaged in public practice
or otherwise).
The members of the advisory council will be appointed by the
chairman of the Institute, who will also name the chairman of the
council. No member of the council (including its chairman) will
be a member of the standards board. Members will be appointed for
one-year terms but may be reappointed. They should not normally
serve for more than three years in total. They will serve without pay
but will be entitled to claim reimbursement for expenses.
We recommend that the council meet at least once a quarter,
in public. It should have a small staff of perhaps one or two persons,
separate from the staff of the board, to assist it in carrying out its
duties, including preparation of an annual report on the board’s
activities.

A Fellowship Program

The work of the board could be further strengthened by the creation
of a small number of fellowships, tenable normally for from eighteen
months to two years. Fellows might be academics with auditing
experience or practitioners who, while serving the board, would be
enhancing their own education. Their stipends would be provided
for in the board’s budget.

Conclusion
When a profession is under fire, it is tempting to propose dramatic
reforms, which may have cosmetic advantages if no others. We
have resisted that temptation. We believe that the proposals made
in this report are responsive to the needs of the situation. They will
enable the task of setting auditing standards to proceed more
effectively and with a minimum of disruption.
We conclude this report with a quotation, not from an account
ant but from a lawyer who is more than usually well-informed about
the accounting profession:
The involvement of the accounting profession in the establishment of
professional standards has been of substantial public benefit not only
by virtue of the standards thus developed and improved, but also by
serving as a focal point for the organization, recognition and develop
ment of the accounting profession itself. To a substantial extent,
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the rise of the accounting profession has been grounded on that
involvement. A profession actively involved in the development of
its standards will do a better job in their application. By their efforts,
the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, and the inde
pendent Financial Accounting Standards Board, have provided a rea
sonably coherent framework for accounting and auditing practice in
areas that otherwise would have been subjected to fragmented or
conflicting regulation.... The process works more than reasonably
well.18

18. James F. Strother, “The Establishment of Generally Accepted Accounting
Principles and Generally Accepted Auditing Standards,” Vanderbilt Law
Review, vol. 28, no. 1, January, 1975, pp. 232-233.
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Appendix
Adoption of the Recommendations of the
Special Committee to Study
the Structure of AudSEC

By a resolution of the Council of the AICPA, the recommendations of the
special committee to study the structure of AudSEC were adopted on May
10,1978, with the following modifications:
1. The AICPA Auditing Standards Board should be composed solely of
members of the AICPA, including members not engaged in public
practice.
2. The chief staff officer should be designated as a vice president
auditing.
3. Reimbursement of expenses of AICPA Auditing Standards Board
members should be available under the present regular Council policy.
4. It is expected that those accepting appointment to the AICPA Audit
ing Standards Board will devote a substantial portion of their time to
the board’s activities. Therefore, upon request, members of the board
shall be compensated on a confidential basis. A standard amount of
such compensation shall be established by the AICPA Board of
Directors.
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